SRMUN ATLANTA 2022
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Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Atlanta 2022 and the United Nations (UN) General Assembly First Committee (GA First), also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). My name is Jasmine Sutherland, and I will be serving as your Director. This will be my third conference as a SRMUN staff member, and my tenth Model UN conference overall. Previously, I served as Director of the Security Council at SRMUN Charlotte 2021 and Director of the United Nations Population Fund - Executive Board (UNFPA-EB) at SRMUN Charlotte 2022. I currently live in Atlanta, Georgia, where I work for a real estate law firm. Our committee Assistant Director will be Katherin Lopez. This is Kat's second year serving as an Assistant Director at SRMUN Atlanta. She is currently pursuing a degree in French and International Affairs with a European Concentration.

DISEC's mission is to work toward global disarmament, address threats to peace, and confront challenges to international security. Currently, DISEC is a plenary-size committee, where all 193 UN Member States can participate in the body's work. The DISEC works toward its goals by structuring the committee into three distinctive stages: general debate, thematic discussions, and action on drafts.

By focusing on the mission of DISEC we have developed the following topics for the delegates to discuss come conference:

I. The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence
II. Combating the Global Illicit Arms Trade

The background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, the background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference.

Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit srmun.org. ***All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, October 28, 2022, by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.***

Kat and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for GA First. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you soon. Please feel free to contact Kat, Austen, or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

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History of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the global community was at a turning point. Politically, economically, and socially, the world was in an upheaval. The ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, the United Nations' (UN) predecessor, to establish a forum for political dialogue between the different facets of the international community led to division and violence.[1] To stabilize the international system, and to prevent such devastation from occurring again, the international community came together to form the beginnings of what would become the UN. In forming the UN, the international community drew upon security and development documents such as the 1941 Atlantic Charter on post-World War II goals, and forums such as the 1943 Tehran Conference on Allied strategy during World War II.[2] On October 24, 1945, the UN Charter was created.[3] In the Charter, six principal organs were defined, distributing the work of the international forum.[4] The broadest of these organs is the General Assembly (GA). The GA equally recognizes all Member States of the UN with the authority to discuss any question pertaining to the duties of the organization.[5] The GA may also make recommendations to the UN Security Council and control the organization's budget.[6]

In order to tackle the myriad social, political, and economic issues of the international community, and to fulfill the purposes of the UN's Charter, the GA is divided into six standing committees.[7] The Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee, or DISEC) was established to assess threats to global security.[8] This purpose extends to dealing with questions and issues that relate to the distribution and production of weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of arms proliferation, technological advancements as a risk to global security, and reducing circumstances where violent outbreaks might occur.[9] Though DISEC's main goal is to promote global peace and security, DISEC does not have the ability to pass resolutions that authorize interventions, as this right is reserved for the Security Council.[10]

Early focus of DISEC resolutions centered on armament stockpiling and the implications of technologically advanced weaponry. Key documents of DISEC's early sessions include, but are not limited to, A/S-10/4, A/S-12/6, and A/S-15/6.[11] Resolution A/S-10/4, adopted in June 1978, discusses the end of the Disarmament Decade and how Member States can move forward to halt the practice of stockpiling weapons.[12] Resolution A/S-10/4 also solidifies the commitment of Member States to the UN to use disarmament as a tool to further social development.[13] In July 1982, DISEC's 12th special session passed Resolution A/S-12/6, implementing the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament and creating collateral measures to reduce nuclear weapon development, reduce the stockpiling of arms, and increase measures in place for international security.[14] An Ad Hoc Committee was also created during this session, consisting of a Chairman, 13 Vice-Chairmen, and a Rapporteur to oversee and implement recommendations made in regards to the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament.[15] In May-June 1988, DISEC's 15th session

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[1] "History of the United Nations," United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un, (accessed August 23, 2022).
[2] "History of the United Nations."
[3] "History of the United Nations."
[4] "History of the United Nations."
[5] "General Assembly of the United Nations," United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml, (accessed August 23, 2022).
[6] "General Assembly of the United Nations."
[7] "General Assembly of the United Nations."
[8] "General Assembly of the United Nations."
[9] "Disarmament and International Security (First Committee)," United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/, (accessed August 23, 2022).
[10] "Disarmament and International Security (First Committee)."
[11] "Disarmament and International Security (First Committee)."
[12] United Nations General Assembly resolution S-10/2, *Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly*, A/S-10/2, June 30, 1978, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/753/40/IMG/NR075340.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed August 23, 2022).
[13] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution S-10/2.
[14] United Nations General Assembly resolution S-12/6, *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly During its Twelfth Special Session*, A/S-12/6, July 10, 1982, https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/6272340.41690826.html,(accessed August 23, 2022).
[15] United Nations General Assembly Resolution S-12/6, *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly During its Twelfth Special Session.*

adopted Resolution A/S-15/6 was adopted to update and review decisions made in earlier sessions to further expand upon previous resolutions based on new information presented at the International Disarmament Conference.[16]

Another role of DISEC is to present the GA with resolutions created by the body for GA adoption. For example, during the 64th General Session (2009), the GA adopted a slate of 48 resolutions (A/RES/64/22 – A/RES64/70) passed by DISEC.[17] These resolutions dealt with issues such as, but not limited to: combating the illicit trade of small arms, prevention of an arms race in space, creating more transparency in military expenditures, and the use of technology as a tool in modern-day warfare.[18] These documents from the 64th General Session set precedent for the issues DISEC discusses today. In the past, DISEC has come under criticism for ineffectual and stagnated resolutions to dynamic and ever-changing problems.[19] However, in recent years, DISEC has begun to rectify this criticism by staying ahead of international issues. In its 67th session (2012), DISEC adopted resolutions calling Member States to actively contribute to a global solution for combatting human trafficking and removing the danger of nuclear war through disarmament through A/67/L.62, which was later adopted by the GA as A/RES/67/39.[20]

The work of DISEC is still valuable to the GA today.[21] In 2021, DISEC completed its 76th session as the GA adopted 55 of the committee's resolutions and decisions.[22] Resolutions in the 76th session focused on nuclear-weapon-free zones, illicit arms and weapons trafficking, and science and technology in security and disarmament.[23] For example, A/RES/76/42 requests the UN Conference on Disarmament consider creating a framework for regional conventional arms control agreements, as a means to tackle arms trafficking.[24] Additionally, the GA passed without a vote DISEC's report A/76/443 on the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament, inviting Member States to continue research into new and emerging science and technology for disarmament related purposes.[25] Other resolution topics included terrorist access to weapons, the weaponization of outer space, and international cooperation for peaceful uses in the context of international security.[26] Looking into 2022, DISEC's 77th session is scheduled for October 3 through November 4, 2022, with general and thematic debate agendas being set prior to the meeting.[27]

[16] United Nations General Assembly resolution S-15/6, *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly During its Fifteenth Special Session*, June 25, 1988, https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/3033836.18593216.html, (accessed August 21, 2022).

[17] United Nations General Assembly, "Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 64th session," United Nations. https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/64, (accessed August 23, 2022).

[18] United Nations General Assembly, "Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 64th session."

[19] "Amid Growing Humanitarian Toll From Spread of Conventional Weapons, Delegates in First Committee Shar Strategies for Combating Illegal Arms Sales," United Nations, October 25, 2018, https://press.un.org/en/2018/gadis3610.doc.htm, (accessed August 23, 2022).

[20] United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/39, *High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament*, A/RES/67/39, December 3, 2012, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/480/94/PDF/N1248094.pdf?OpenElement.

[21] United Nations, "Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad Security Threats, Urging Joint Action to Advance Stalled Denuclearization, Disarmament Efforts," United Nations, December 6, 2021, https://press.un.org/en/2021/ga12392.doc.htm, (accessed August 23, 2022).

[22] United Nations, "Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad Security Threats…

[23] United Nations, "Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad Security Threats…"

[24] United Nations General Assembly resolution 76/42, *Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels*, A/RES/76/42, December 10, 2021, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3951287?ln=en.

[25] United Nations General Assembly report of the First Committee 76/443, *Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament*, A/76/443, November 12, 2021, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/336/36/PDF/N2133636.pdf?OpenElement.

[26] [26] United Nations, "Adopting 55 First Committee Texts, General Assembly Addresses Myriad Security Threats…"

[27] United Nations General Assembly, *Draft provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2022*, A/C.1/76/CRP.5, November 2021, https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/76/pdf/A-C.1-76-CRP.5.pdf, (accessed August 23, 2022).

I. The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence

"If a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent." - Alan Turing [28]

Introduction

Although speaking in the context of rudimentary machines playing against human counterparts, renowned computer scientist Alan Turing's comment on whether machines can be simultaneously infallible and intelligent was intended to make attendees of his 1947 lecture reconsider whether a machine programmed to play chess could do so perfectly.[29] Turing arrived at the conclusion that with intelligence comes inherent mistakes that cannot be programmed out of machinery, and even if the actions themselves are routine and mindless, there is an intelligence that can be formed from the actions being completed repeatedly.[30] This repetition would form the basis of Turing's "Imitation Game," wherein a computer and a human try to convince a third party that they are both human beings.[31] The point of the test was to separate the concept of "intelligence" from the other traits that make a person "human" and demonstrate that machinery has the capability to imitate human intelligence. True human intelligence, however, is influenced by thoughts, behavioral patterns, and past experiences, all of which cannot necessarily be programmed into a machine.[32] Almost 80 years later, Turing's concepts have permeated many critical areas of society, including the way Member States engage in military operations and conflicts.[33] While the consequences of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in warfighting have not yet been fully realized, they are widely expected to be substantial, and Member State governments are racing to be the first develop and integrate it into their militaries.[34]

History

Prior to World War II, computing technology consisted almost exclusively of machines designed to make mathematical calculations easier and faster.[35] Many of these machines were mechanical, but beginning in 1939 with the Atanasoff-Berry Computer (ABC), electronics became essential to their design and operation, allowing the possibility of a greater range of functions than simple arithmetic calculations.[36] By the end of World War II, however, there was now a new need for technologies that could both efficiently store commands and execute them.[37] In 1950, Turing, who had been writing on the topic of probability theory since 1935, published his paper, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence."[38] The paper, now referred to as "The Turing Test," introduced the previously mentioned concept of the "Imitation Game" and an abstract machine, now referred to as the "Turing machine."[39] Said machine served to determine the incommutability of certain mathematical problems, and assuming it was able to fully capture the notion of "computability," it would imply that this universal machine would be able to compute anything, and if something was not computable by the machine, it was considered to be incomputable entirely.[40] Turing would not get to see how the field of mathematics would pave the way for the programming

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[28] Andrew Hodges, "Alan Turing," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing/#pagetopright.
[29] Andrew Hodges, "Alan Turing," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[30] Andrew Hodges, "Alan Turing," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[31] Andrew Hodges, "Alan Turing," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[32] Andrew Hodges, "Alan Turing," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[33] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)," *Modern War Institute at West Point,* https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/.
[34] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)," *Modern War Institute at West Point,* https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/.
[35] "Atanasoff Berry Computer," JVA Initiative Committee and Iowa State University, 2011, accessed July 16, 2022. https://jva.cs.iastate.edu/operation.php.
[36] "Timeline of Computer History," *Computer History Museum,* https://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/computers/.
[37] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence. Last modified August 28, 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
[38] "Alan Mathison Turing," JVA Initiative Committee and Iowa State University, 2011, accessed July 16, 2022. https://jva.cs.iastate.edu/operation.php.
[39] "Alan Mathison Turing," JVA Initiative Committee and Iowa State University, 2011, accessed July 16, 2022. https://jva.cs.iastate.edu/operation.php .
[40] Liesbeth De Mol, "Turing Machines," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing/#pagetopright.

behind future weapons of war, as he died by presumed suicide in 1954.[41] His passing was a year shy of the creation of both "The Logic Theorist" and the term "Artificial Intelligence." "The Logic Theorist" is considered by many to be the first artificial intelligence program.[42] Created by Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Herbert Simon, "The Logic Theorist" is the first program specifically meant to mimic the problem-solving skills associated with "human intelligence."[43] "The Logic Theorist" was funded by the RAND corporation, one of the first Cold War-era thinktanks.[44] The connections between war and artificial intelligence were nascent but, to fund innovative research into "Artificial Intelligence," RAND accepted donations from the Department of Defense, Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission.[45] The vested interest of the United States (US) Armed Forces in the evolution of AI is not harmless and the research conducted on these departments' behalf has gone towards influencing decades of foreign policy.[46]

Following "The Logic Theorist" was Professor Joseph Weizenbaum's ELIZA program in 1965. ELIZA was the world's first chatbot and could carry on a conversation regarding any topic in the English language.[47] ELIZA's creation showed that computers were capable of replicating basic aspects of human intelligence, such as the interpretation of language and responding to more than simple preset inputs — a significant advancement beyond the simple arithmetic calculations performed by the first computers.[48] They also showed governments, in particular that of the US, that AI might produce vital military benefits, leading that Member State's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to begin investing in its research and development.[49]

Approximately 16 years later, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry began an USD 850 Million project called "The Fifth Generation Computer" project.[50] Emerging out of the AI movement of the 1980s, the "Fifth Generation" of computers were meant to be integrated hardware and software systems that would make knowledge information processing more efficient.[51] The Japanese developers intended for this project to span a decade and produce computers that were "intelligent, friendly, and programmed in predicate logic."[52] Predicate logic is defined as a formal language where propositions are expressed in terms of predicates, variables, and quantifiers.[53] Predicates, variables, and quantifiers are considered symbols in mathematics and make up the foundations of every logistical argument. The "Fifth Generation" project was meant to be a collective effort by Japanese programmers and mathematicians to produce original research they would share with other Member States to improve perceptions of their societies.[54] Current computing systems are based off the findings of the "Fifth Generation" project and computers now translate almost every language, interpret pictures, carry out conversations, and reason like human beings.[55] The advent of technologies such as parallel processing, high-performance computers (also known as "supercomputers,") and the integrated circuit enabled computers to become more efficient, packing more processing

[41] "Alan Mathison Turing," JVA Initiative Committee and Iowa State University, 2011, accessed July 16, 2022. https://jva.cs.iastate.edu/operation.php.
[42] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence. Last modified August 28, 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
[43] Liesbeth De Mol, "Turing Machines," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing/#pagetopright.
[44] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence. Last modified August 28, 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
[45] "John Clifford Shaw Papers," National Museum of American History, accessed July 18, 2022. https://www.si.edu/object/archives/sova-nmah-ac-0580.
[46] "John Clifford Shaw Papers," National Museum of American History.
[47] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence. Last modified August 28, 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
[48] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence.
[49] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence.
[50] Ehud Y. Shapiro, "The Fifth Generation Project-A Trip Report," Weizmann Institute of Science. Last modified September 1983, https://dl.acm.org/doi/epdf/10.1145/358172.358179.
[51] Ehud Y. Shapiro, "The Fifth Generation Project-A Trip Report," Weizmann Institute of Science.
[52] Ehud Y. Shapiro, "The Fifth Generation Project-A Trip Report," Weizmann Institute of Science.
[53] Ehud Y. Shapiro, "The Fifth Generation Project-A Trip Report," Weizmann Institute of Science.
[54] Ehud Y. Shapiro, "The Fifth Generation Project-A Trip Report," Weizmann Institute of Science.
[55] Rockwell Anyoha, "The History of Artificial Intelligence," Special Edition on Artificial Intelligence. Last modified August 28, 2017, https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.

power into the same or smaller spaces, and also allowed them to handle greater amounts of data, forming the basis for the decision-making processes that characterize modern AI platforms.[56]

Current Situation

The current popular discussion of AI's military applications centers around the development and deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), or systems that can detect, track, and attack targets without the intervention of a human controller.[57] Though a critical topic to the maintenance of international peace, LAWS are not currently being fielded by any major military.[58] Lesser-known, but still just as important, are the applications of AI to military decision-making and logistical processes, and the impacts its usage in these areas may have on conflicts in the future.[59]

AI and Military Decision-Making

Currently, one of AI's biggest advantages is in its ability to quickly analyze huge amounts of data and make predictions based on that analysis.[60] This capability is expected to aid militaries in various fields, including maintenance and logistics, by informing operators and maintenance technicians when a piece of equipment might be about to fail, or which units have the highest maintenance needs in order to target repair efforts and keep larger portions of a Member State's military combat-ready.[61] AI systems can also recognize different pieces of equipment in an image, allowing leaders a clearer picture of the size and composition of a potentially hostile force, or of their own forces, in a given area.[62]

These applications can make AI useful as a decision-making aid, allowing commanders access to greater amounts of information than they and their staffs would be able to quickly process.[63] There exist substantial downsides, however, including the possible removal of human ethical and emotional considerations, international legal restrictions, and the corruption of the AI system or its data by an adversary.[64] The ethical and legal concerns with using AI for predictive and decision-making purposes parallel those surrounding LAWS in that, whether the system is informing a human military commander or making the decision to execute an attack itself, if it is not programmed to adhere to the laws of war and other international laws, the potential for war crimes and human-rights violations increase drastically.[65] Unlike a single LAWS, such as a drone armed with an antitank missile, an AI system that influences the decision of a theatre commander could impact tens of thousands of lives, if not more.[66]

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

Though only in the concept and development stages, militaries around the world are beginning to explore the possible advantages that LAWS could bring them, such as the ability to operate in environments or situations that

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[56] "Timeline of Computer History," *Computer History Museum*, https://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/computers/.

[57] Sameeksha Agrawal, "Autonomous Weapon Systems: Our New Soldiers, or a Disaster Waiting to Happen?," *Viterbi Conversations in Ethics*, 2021, https://vce.usc.edu/volume-5-issue-1/autonomous-weapon-systems-our-new-soldiers-or-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen/.

[58] Kelley M. Sayler, "Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems," *Congressional Research Service*, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150.

[59] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)," *Modern War Institute at West Point*, https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/.

[60] Robert W. Button, "Artificial Intelligence and the Military," *TheRANDBlog*, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/artificial-intelligence-and-the-military.html.

[61] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)," *Modern War Institute at West Point*, https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/.

[62] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)."

[63] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think."

[64] David Banks, "How Adversarial Attacks Could Destabilize Military AI Systems," *IEEE Spectrum*, 2020, https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-guided-robots-are-ready-to-sort-your-recyclables.

[65] Giacomo Persi Paoli, Kerstin Vignard, David Danks, and Paul Meyer, "Modernizing Arms Control: Exploring responses to the use of AI in military decision-making," *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*, 2020, https://www.unidir.org/publication/modernizing-arms-control.

[66] Paul Maxwell, "Artificial Intelligence is the Future of Warfare (Just Not in the Way You Think)," *Modern War Institute at West Point*, https://mwi.usma.edu/artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-just-not-way-think/.

are physically impermissible to humans and thus currently unavailable.[67] An autonomous airborne drone, for example, could operate according to the maximum physical tolerances of its mechanical components, rather than those of the human body, enabling it to be more agile than warplanes piloted by humans, or to loiter over a target for days at a time without growing tired or needing food and water.[68] Additionally, the use of unmanned machines in combat would likely mean fewer troop deaths, decreasing the human cost of a conflict for the side(s) possessing them.[69]

Though they are not without their advantages, the risks posed by LAWS are well-documented and grave enough that 29 Member States and 165 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have called for a ban on LAWS before they can be fielded operationally by the world's militaries.[70, 71] Chief among the concerns expressed about these nonhuman weapons of war is that they would be programmed to decide whether or not to take human lives, thereby removing accountability from the human beings in a Member State's government or military for their actions.[72] Because a machine cannot be punished in the same way that humans can, LAWS on the battlefield have the potential to undermine the entire international legal regime regarding the conduct of war, the treatment of prisoners, and actions against civilians.[73]

Beyond the risks to individual humans, LAWS may pose a serious threat to the maintenance of international peace. RAND Corporation scholar Burgess Laird writes that, at a moment of high tension between two Member States that has not yet escalated to armed conflict, the mere presence of LAWS may be enough to destabilize the situation because one or more of the parties involved may "fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decision-making. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position."[74] Furthermore, one of AI's greatest advantages—the ability to process large amounts of data and make decisions on it faster than a human—can become a disastrous liability in a crisis by causing the machine's decision-making to outstrip that of the humans employing it, thus taking the power out of their hands and potentially escalating a given situation without their intent.[75] Finally, given that AI's ability to make decisions depends greatly upon how and what it was trained to do, any weapon system operating autonomously is prone to mistakes either in how it was trained or in what its sensors perceive.[76] On September 26, 1983, a ballistic missile early warning system operated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) detected what it believed to be a preemptive nuclear strike by the US on its territory.[77] The system's sensors sent an alert to launch a counterstrike, which was averted only by human intervention and intuition that the system was malfunctioning.[78] A launch was avoided in that case, but a fully

[67] Burgess Laird, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations," *TheRANDBlog*, 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html.

[68] Burgess Laird, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations."

[69] Burgess Laird, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations."

[70] Kelley M. Sayler, "Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems," *Congressional Research Service*, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150.

[71] Brian Stauffer, "Stopping Killer Robots: Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Maintaining Human Control," *Human Rights Watch*, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and.

[72] Sameeksha Agrawal, "Autonomous Weapon Systems: Our New Soldiers, or a Disaster Waiting to Happen?," *Viterbi Conversations in Ethics*, 2021, https://vce.usc.edu/volume-5-issue-1/autonomous-weapon-systems-our-new-soldiers-or-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen/.

[73] Sameeksha Agrawal, "Autonomous Weapon Systems: Our New Soldiers, or a Disaster Waiting to Happen?"

[74] Burgess Laird, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations," *TheRANDBlog*, 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html.

[75] Burgess Laird, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations,"

[76] David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy*, (New York, Anchor Books, 2011), 7-11.

[77] David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy*.

[78] David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy*.

autonomous system that functions independently of human intervention may act on the malfunction if it interprets the data received from its sensors as meeting the criteria for action.[79] Humans have given machines more autonomy (defined as the degree of freedom a machine has to achieve its goals), as they have been perceived to be getting more intelligent.[80] Regardless of how intelligent they appear, current iterations of AI have a narrow intelligence that make it easy for them to excel in a singular domain, but they lack the reasoning necessary to make nuanced decisions, like discerning a terrorist cell from a group of congregating civilians.[81]

Actions Taken by the United Nations

Concern about the risks associated with LAWS have been a primary stimulant for discussion among Member States. In 2017, the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) established a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to study the topic of LAWS and submit a report to the CCW.[82] The GGE currently meets twice a year and concluded its fifth session on July 29, 2022. The recommendations from its report on this session worked to directly address some of the concerns highlighted in the previous section around LAWS, including the prohibition on autonomous weapons that cannot be programmed or controlled in a manner that ensures compliance with international humanitarian law, that would absolve human commanders of their culpability under international humanitarian law, and to ensure that LAWS are not designed or used in such a manner that might cause the unintentional escalation of tensions or conflicts.[83] At its 2019 session, the GGE adopted 11 principles governing the use of LAWS that it uses to guide its decision-making and shape its recommendations, including the need to maintain human accountability for the actions of LAWS and that international humanitarian law applies to all autonomous weapons.[84]

In addition to the GGE, The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) maintain information centers to add to the body of research surrounding LAWS and other uses of AI in military conflicts.[85] However, little other substantive progress has been made on the topic of lethal autonomous weapons. While high-level UN officials, including Secretary General Antonio Guterres, have called for the prohibition of LAWS, no UN resolutions or international treaties have been adopted accomplishing this goal.[86]

Conclusion

The utilization of artificial intelligence, in place of human reasoning, should be done within reason. There are certain decisions that AI are unable to effectively make. Benefits such as streamlined logistics, better training for soldiers, and higher-quality data analytics can have positive impacts for Member State militaries without creating risks to international peace and security. Weapons that utilize AI, however, must be carefully managed or restricted, to the point where they cannot operate without human control and accountability in compliance with international

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[79] David E. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy*.

[80] United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research. The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Artificial Intelligence. Geneva, CH: UNIDIR, 2018.

[81] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Artificial Intelligence. Geneva, CH: UNIDIR, 2018.

[82] "Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference," Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 2016.

[83] "Report of the 2022 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System, Geneva, 2022.

[84] "Final Report," Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 2019.; "Background on LAWS in the CCW," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/.

[85] "Publications," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, https://www.unidir.org/publications.; "Background on LAWS in the CCW," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/.

[86] "Autonomous weapons that kill must be banned, insists UN chief," UN News, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035381.

humanitarian law. While national legislation and military policies concerning the use of LAWS in combat are either in place or being adopted, they are not universal and are subject to reversal or repeal.[87] Until such time as the inherent risks can be mitigated without the involvement of a human failsafe, the need for humans to remain in control of weapons systems, even unmanned ones, is paramount to ensure the survival of international humanitarian law, and to the very maintenance of international peace and security.

Committee Directive

One thing that is certain is that "Artificial Intelligence" will continue to evolve, whether humans want it to or not. As it evolves there needs to be careful consideration as to how the new technological developments can be used during times of conflict and how they should be regulated during non-conflict periods. Delegates should come to committee prepared with knowledge of the policies regulating LAWS and the ability to relate specific goals to the problems outline in this background guide. Delegates should also understand the central elements of disarmament policy, how it pertains to LAWS, and its influence on the parties creating and implementing autonomous weapons. Consideration should also be placed on how Member States can facilitate technological development by utilizing current "Artificial Intelligence" technology and policy. It is this committee's directive to review and establish recommendations to advance this goal, in hopes of extending the peaceful use and exploration of outer space for all its Member States.

[87] Kelley M. Sayler, "Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems," *Congressional Research Service*, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150.

II. Combatting the Global Illicit Arms Trade

Introduction

The global trade of arms is often conducted between Member States and by private entities in accordance with national and international laws.[88] However, the illegal trafficking of weapons around the globe is a USD 7 Billion industry that presents a significant obstacle to global security.[89] Compared to the trading of other illicit products like drugs and counterfeit goods, arms trafficking has a profound impact on the security of a state when political and organized crime groups obtain illegal weapons.[90] Areas with weak or non-existent state governance often see illicit weapons trades proliferate, turning trafficking into a status of power for the trafficking group.[91] The damaging security effects of illicit arms trading are global, as smuggled weapons flow between and destabilize more Member States.[92] The United Nations (UN) had worked to address this global security issue through various protocols and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.1, making a commitment to reduce illegal arms flows.[93] However, the patchwork of laws, regulations, and enforcement tools currently in place provides loopholes for the continued proliferation of arms trafficking, necessitating redoubled international efforts to counter it.[94]

History

The global trade in arms has existed for centuries due to the lucrative nature and predictable profit increases year after year of the industry.[95] Some of the first instances were seen in the 16th century, as traders from Europe begun arms trafficking into America, Africa, and Asia.[96] Arms trafficking continued uninhibited until the 1920s, when the practice began to have a destabilizing effect on colonial empires.[97] Recognizing the threat to their security posed by the unrestricted movement of weaponry, colonial powers led a push for arms export limits.[98] Developing states within these empires, however, rejected arms export limits, claiming arms limits reduced sovereignty and security.[99] Though the League of Nations made several attempts at controlling arms trafficking, one of the first successes of arms trafficking control was the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925.[100] While the Convention was never enforced, it had a constructive effect of compiling and publishing statistics on arms trafficking.[101]

Arms trafficking rapidly rose during the Cold War between 1945-1989 as stockpiles of arms were abandoned following World War II.[102] This led to private companies buying and managing 90 percent of world's private trade in

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[88] Illicit Trade Group. "Illegal Arms Trafficking: Definition, Nature and Scale of Illicit Firearms Trafficking." Illicit Trade, 2022. https://illicittrade.org/illegal-arms-trafficking, (accessed August 25, 2022).

[89] The Bottom Line Up Front. "Mapping the networks behind the illicit arms trade and inhibiting the flow of weapons into conflict zones." C4ADS. https://c4ads.org/illicit-arms-trade/. Accessed September 01, 2022.

[90] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking." In *The Routledge Handbook of Smuggling*, 1st ed. Routledge, 2021. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-16/arms-trafficking-nicholas-marsh-lauren-pinson.

[91] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

[92] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

[93] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

[94] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

[95] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Arms Trade." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att, (accessed August 26, 2022).

[96] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms." Origins: Current Event in Historical Perspective, November 2012. https://origins.osu.edu/article/merchants-death-international-traffic-arms?language_content_entity=en.

[97] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."

[98] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."

[99] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."

[100] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."

[101] Barton, Mary S. "Ch 4. The Arms Traffic Conference of 1925." In *Counterterrorism Between the Wars: An International History, 1919-1937*, 102–28. Oxford University Press, 2020. https://academic.oup.com/book/32052/chapter-abstract/267855933?redirectedFrom=fulltext, (accessed August 26, 2022).

[102] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms." Origins: Current Event in Historical Perspective, November 2012. https://origins.osu.edu/article/merchants-death-international-traffic-arms?language_content_entity=en, (accessed August 26, 2022).

guns by 1953.[103] While these businesses were approved by powerful Member States, they supplied many volatile and hostile regimes with arms, as was the case with the arms used to overthrow the Guatemalan government in 1954 and arms used by both sides in the Costa Rican Civil War."[104] While the private arms trade was in the millions of US dollars, the government-to-government arms trade was in the billions of dollars during and post the Cold War.[105] Before the 1970s, global exports of arms rarely exceeded USD 5 Billion annually, with developing Member States accounting for less than 50 percent of those sales.[106] These figures skyrocketed in the 1970s and 1980s, as the United States (US) and the Soviet Union exported more than 60 percent of arms entering developing Member States.[107] The illicit arms trade sprung from these vast licit arms deals.[108]

The 1990s saw a rise in illicit weapons trading following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[109] Former Soviet light weapons saturated the international arms market.[110] This influx was abetted by large waves of demand for arms stemming from the decade's numerous intrastate conflicts, particularly within Africa and the Middle East.[111] Many African conflicts of the 1990s were exacerbated not only by the usage of illicit arms, but by their resale by the parties to the conflicts as a source of funding.[112] The UN imposed several arms embargos on Member States, such Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda, in efforts to stifle the illicit arms trade that was fueling conflict within each Member State.[113] Despite these efforts, the arms trade continued to proliferate, aiding in the start and continuation of conflict around the world.[114]

Current Situation

The UN Security Council reports that as of 2020, the spread of small arms and light weapons remained a major threat to international security.[115] The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime's 2021 Global Organized Crime Index ranked arms trafficking as the third most prevalent criminal market internationally.[116] By 2020, an estimated one billion small arms were in circulation globally.[117] The use of illicit arms remains prevalent in the Americas, Africa, and southern Europe, in both conflict and non-conflict settings.[118]

Today, the illicit and licit arms markets are becoming increasingly blurred, as state and private institutions play a significant role in illegal arms access.[119] Additionally, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have called out certain Member States for supplying weapons to rebels, insurgent groups, and terrorist organizations.[120] Technical challenges of monitoring and eliminating illicit arms markets remain, as there exists a lack of detailed reporting on the international flow of illicit arms and their spread.[121] The spread of illegal weapons is hastened by governmental

[103] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[104] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[105] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[106] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[107] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[108] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[109] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[110] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[111] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[112] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[113] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[114] Grant, Jonathan. "'Merchants of Death': The International Traffic in Arms."
[115] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Tells Security Council." United Nations Press, February 5, 2020. https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14098.doc.htm, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[116] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact." Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf.
[117] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide…"
[118] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide…"
[119] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[120] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide…"
[121] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Tells Security Council." United Nations Press, February 5, 2020. https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14098.doc.htm, (accessed August 25, 2022).

failures at securing weapons stockpiles and the falsification of export documents.[122] Arms trafficking is enabled by corruption within Member States, as well as lack of accountability at all levels of government to handle arms trafficking.[123] For example, a 2022 report stated only 12 percent of firearms globally were registered in accordance with the UN Firearms Protocol.[124] Additionally, the rapid increase in manufacturing technology, such as 3D printing, has created new challenges in tracing and monitoring the illicit trade of arms.[125] Various regional cross-border initiatives have been put in place to monitor and reduce the spread of small arms, aiming to increase regional cooperation, improve arms regulations, and build local capacity to handle illicit arms trading.[126] However, the evasion of legal regulations by criminal and terrorist organizations, as well as private entities, continues to hinder local capacity-building efforts.[127] Recent studies by nongovernmental organizations have found Member States contributing to the illicit trade of ammunition and arms against UN arms embargos.[128] For example, several illicit arms seized through international monitoring of the arms trade in the Somali conflict were produced in Member States outside the Horn of Africa.[129]

The illicit arms markets support much of the current organized crime and conflict that is deteriorating international security.[130] Arms trading for organized crimes groups breaks down to the sale and distribution of illicit goods and services.[131] As such, developments in economic technology and trade are becoming increasingly prevalent in the global illicit arms market.[132] Illicit online marketplaces and the rise of cryptocurrency have proven to be major innovations in the illicit arms trade.[133] The presence of physical illicit arms markets has been linked to other forms of crime, including human trafficking, drug smuggling, and violent crime.[134] These arms markets continue to be prevalent in developing and destabilized Member States and regions, where the trade of illegal goods generates income for organized crime groups, non-state actors, and private entities.[135]

Actions Taken by the United Nations

The UN's work on disarmament and combatting illicit arms trading takes place in the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).[136] Established in 1982 by the UN General Assembly (GA), UNODA supports the efforts of the UN towards general and complete disarmament.[137] The UNODA's mandate come from priorities established by relevant GA resolutions and decisions on disarmament.[138] The UNODA is critical to overseeing UN disarmament treaties and instruments, including provisions on illicit arms trading.[139] As such, UNODA coordinates with the UN

[122] United Nations. "Spread of 1 Billion Small Arms, Light Weapons Remains Major Threat Worldwide…"
[123] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact." Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf.
[124] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[125] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Small Arms: New Technologies." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/small-arms-new-technologies/, (accessed August 26, 2022).
[126] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[127] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[128] Illicit Trade Group. "Illegal Arms Trafficking: Definition, Nature and Scale of Illicit Firearms Trafficking." Illicit Trade, 2022. https://illicittrade.org/illegal-arms-trafficking, (accessed August 26, 2022).
[129] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia." Small Arms Survey Research Notes. Small Arms Survey, October 2016. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Research-Note-61.pdf.
[130] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[131] Weber, Julia, and Edwin W. Kruisbergen. "Criminal Markets: The Dark Web, Money Laundering and Counterstrategies - An Overview of the 10th Research Conference on Organized Crime." *Trends in Organized Crime* 22, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 346–56. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12117-019-09365-8.
[132] Weber, Julia, and Edwin W. Kruisbergen. "Criminal Markets: The Dark Web, Money Laundering and Counterstrategies…"
[133] Weber, Julia, and Edwin W. Kruisbergen. "Criminal Markets: The Dark Web, Money Laundering and Counterstrategies…"
[134] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[135] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."
[136] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "About Us." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. https://www.un.org/disarmament/about/, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[137] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "About Us."
[138] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "About Us."
[139] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Small Arms and Light Weapons." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/, (accessed August 25, 2022).

system on global arms trading, both licit and illicit. Additional roles include providing advice and assisting in implementation of arms trade regulation and capacity building through UNODA regional centers, located in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean.[140]

In 2001, the UN adopted two critical components of its strategy to regulate the illegal arms trade. On May 31, 2001, the GA adopted The UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking of Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) as A/RES/55/255. The treaty, which entered into force in 2005, provided "a framework for States to control and regulate licit arms and arms flows, prevent their diversion into the illegal circuit, facilitate the investigation and prosecution of related offences without hampering legitimate transfers."[141] In July, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted.[142] The PoA provides the framework for which Member States can engage in cooperation and assistance in combatting illicit small arms trading.[143] Under the PoA, Member States agreed to implement national small arms laws, trading regulations on arms, and stockpile management.[144] In 2005, within the PoA framework, GA adopted the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), which required Member States to "ensure that weapons are properly marked and that records are kept" so that they could be traced anywhere in the world.[145] The ITI was used as the standard for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development provisions on weapons tracing, creating a normative framework by which all UN Member States have agreed to abide.[146] Member States report on the implementation of both the PoA and the ITI every two years.[147]

In 2013, the UN Member States recommitted their efforts to combating the illicit arms trade by adopting the ATT as A/RES/67/234 B.[148] The ATT is an international treaty regulating the trade of conventional arms in order to prevent and eliminate illicit arms trading.[149] The ATT is a reaffirmation that Member States have the sovereign duty to be the central provider of security for their civilians, in conjunction with the rule of law.[150] As such, the ATT commits Member States to assuring armed and security forces are provided with legitimately-sourced weapons, acquired through national production or legal import.[151] Additionally, weapons providers must assure the weapons being traded are transferred and stored securely as to not be trafficked.[152] As of 2022, the ATT have been ratified by 111 Member States and signed by an additional 30 Member States.[153] As part of ATT compliance, the UN hosts a Conference of State Parties annually to review treaty implementation, make recommendations based on the treaty, and evaluate interpretations of the treaty.[154] The 2021 Conference of State Parties (CSP7) produced a final report on

[140] United Nations Office for. "Arms Trade." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[141] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "The Firearms Protocol." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Accessed September 01, 2022.
[142] United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, A/CONF.192/15, July 20, 2001, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/507/20/PDF/N0150720.pdf?OpenElement.
[143] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Programme of Action on Small Arms and Its International Tracing Instrument." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/programme-of-action, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[144] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Programme of Action on Small Arms and Its International Tracing Instrument."
[145] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Small Arms and Light Weapons."
[146] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Small Arms and Light Weapons."
[147] Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons. "Country Profiles." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. https://smallarms.un-arm.org. (Accessed September 01, 2022.)
[148] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Small Arms and Light Weapons."
[149] Arms Trade Treaty. "The Arms Trade Treaty." Arms Trade Treaty, 2022. https://thearmstradetreaty.org, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[150] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "The Arms Trade Treaty." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. https://www.un.org/disarmament/att/, (accessed August 25, 2022).
[151] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "The Arms Trade Treaty."
[152] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. "The Arms Trade Treaty."
[153] Arms Trade Treaty. "The Arms Trade Treaty."
[154] "The Arms Trade Treaty," entered into force December 24, 2014, *United Nations Treaty Collective*, https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf.

the thematic discussion of small arms and light weapons stockpile management.[155] The CSP7 report considers a proposed set of areas in which state parties could map and utilize existing guidance and tools to prevent arms trafficking and stockpiling, as well as how to effectively implement ATT working groups.[156] The 2022 Conference of State Parties (CSP8) was hosted August 22 through the 26 in Geneva, Switzerland, with a thematic discussion of port shipment controls.[157]

Case Study

Somalia

By the end of 1991, the Federal Republic of Somalia was on the verge of collapse.[158] Internal tensions escalated to the 1988 civil war, which saw the rise of ethnic warfare, various political ousting, and humanitarian violations.[159] By December 1991, Somalia was torn apart by clan-based conflict, a prolonged drought, and the destruction of social and economic infrastructure.[160] The government of Somalia collapsed in March 1992.[161] In response to the conflict and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, the UN Security Council mandated a peacekeeping operation and placed an arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992.[162] The UN kept the arms embargo until 2013, in which the Security Council partially lifted provisional rules of the embargo for some weapon types to improve the capacity of the official security forces of the Somali government.[163] The goal of the partial embargo lift was to allow the Somali government to manage their state stockpiles and distribution to state security forces.[164] However, weak security provisions within the Somali government enabled illicit weapons flows within contentious zones of the Member State.[165]

Powerful clan militias and non-state actors that control parts of Somalia have engaged in illicit arms trafficking, often consigning the government's regulations to irrelevance within the area.[166] The internal illicit arms trafficking comes from intentional leakage and sale of these arms to non-state actors, black market trading of stolen weapons, and weapons stolen from the battlefield from the Somali government security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia.[167] The Small Arms Survey found weapons leakage often comes from the blurred lines between state security officers and non-state forces.[168] Members of the Somalia National Army and Somali Police Force have been linked to ethnic militias and other non-state actors, resulting in the high rate of weapons diffusion of state weapons to non-state forces.[169]

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[155] Arms Trade Treaty Conference of States Parties. "Seventh Conference of States Parties Final Report." ATT/CSP7/2021/SEC/681/Conf.FinRep.Rev1, September 2, 2021, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1)%20-%2002%20September%202021/CSP7%20Final%20Report%20(ATT.CSP7.2021.SEC.681.Con.FinRep.Rev1)%20-%2002%20September%202021.pdf.

[156] Arms Trade Treaty Conference of States Parties. "Seventh Conference of States Parties Final Report."

[157] Arms Trade Treaty. "Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8)." Arms Trade Treaty, August 2022. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/csp-8.html, (accessed August 25, 2022).

[158] Healy, Sally, and Mark Bradbury. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict." *Accord*, no. 21 (February 2010). https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict.

[159] Healy, Sally, and Mark Bradbury. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."

[160] Healy, Sally, and Mark Bradbury. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."

[161] Healy, Sally, and Mark Bradbury. "Endless War: A Brief History of the Somali Conflict."

[162] United Nations Security Council resolution 751, *Resolution 751 (1992) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting, on 24 April 1992*, S/RES/751(1992), April 24, 1992, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/141599?ln=en.

[163] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia." Small Arms Survey Research Notes. Small Arms Survey, October 2016. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/measuring-illicit-arms-flows-somalia-research-note-61.

[164] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[165] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[166] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[167] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[168] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[169] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

Somalia also received a large amount of external arms trafficking, most notably from prominent non-state actor Islamist militia Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen (al-Shabaab), which controls rural areas in southern Somalia.[170] The UN-mandated Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group reported al-Shabaab has contributed to a weapons trafficking line from Yemen.[171] These weapons have then been dispersed throughout Somalia and neighboring Member States, further destabilizing the region.[172] Additionally, the UN has reported neighboring Member States have ignored the UN arms embargo, delivering weapons within Somalia without proper notification.[173] A 2022 report stated over 60 percent of the illicit weapons in Somalia were manufactured outside of the Horn of Africa region.[174] The influx of outside weapons, coupled with the continual theft of Somali security force weapons, threatens to further destabilize the Horn of Africa, as intricate arms trafficking networks spread deeper into the region and deteriorating security conditions within Somalia open more ungoverned spaces for illicit trafficking to proliferate.[175]

Conclusion

The trade of illicit arms continues to be a high priority for the UN and its Member States.[176] Illicit trafficking of arms exacerbates conflict nationally, disperses the instability regionally, and affects the international community through its political and economic harm.[177] The illicit nature of this type of arms trade can occur along any part of the manufacturing and procurement process, making any participating entity capable of fueling the illegal trafficking network.[178] From manufacturing parts and ammunition, to improving stockpile safeguards, to enacting more effective monitoring regulations, Member States are responsible for ensuring illicit arms are not allowed to flourish within the international trading networks, including black market trading.[179] All types of arms trade that are not authorized in full compliance with national and international laws and regulations pose a threat to the stability of Member States and the international community.[180] Whether the trade is wholly-private, or partially or fully state-sanctioned, the illicit trafficking of arms is becoming continuously blurred, creating more need for the international community to come to a consensus on the framework used to monitor and combat illicit arms trafficking.[181]

Committee Directive

While in committee, delegates should consider the various security implications of illegal arms trafficking within their Member State, their region, and the international community, such as traditional security, economic security, and humanitarian effects. Delegates should consider their Member State's domestic arms regulations and participation in regional and international arms treaties, and how their Member State's participation, or lack thereof, affects illicit arms trading. In doing so, delegates should ask themselves: What initiatives in current domestic, regional, and international arms trading programs have seen positive change in monitoring and combating illicit arms trading, and which have not? What social, political, economic, and security issues prevent Member States and

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[170] Bertelsmann Transformation Index. "BTI 2022 Somalia Country Report," 2022. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report?isocode=SOM&cHash=ab960c304b83678b27d12d1004b5f962.

[171] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[172] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia."

[173] Carlson, Khristopher. "Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia." Small Arms Survey Research Notes. Small Arms Survey, October 2016. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Research-Note-61.pdf.

[174] Bahadur, Jay. "The Price of Civil War: A Survey of Somalia's Arms Market." Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2022. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Price-of-civil-war-13.04-web.pdf.

[175] Bahadur, Jay. "The Price of Civil War: A Survey of Somalia's Arms Market."

[176] United Nations General Assembly resolution 76/232, *The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects*, A/RES/76/232, December 2021, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/417/28/PDF/N2141728.pdf?OpenElement.

[177] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking." In *The Routledge Handbook of Smuggling*, 1st ed. Routledge, 2021.https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-16/arms-trafficking-nicholas-marsh-lauren-pinson.

[178] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact." Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf.

[179] Vázquez del Mercado, Guillermo. "Arms Trafficking and Organized Crime: Global Trade, Local Impact."

[180] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

[181] Marsh, Nicholas, and Lauren Pinson. "Ch. 16: Arms Trafficking."

private corporations from strengthening actions on arms regulations? How could illicit weapons manufacturing at the national and subnational levels affect the international community? How can current international agreements on the topic be improved? What future challenges may present themselves in addressing solutions to the problem? Overall, delegates should address these questions with realistic solutions for implementing their goals. Delegates should focus on building upon what the current UN-established bodies are already working on rather than creating new bodies within the UN system. Delegates should also focus on the issue as a whole and not specific situations of any single Member State.

Annotated Bibliography

I. The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence

Maas, Matthijis M. "How Viable is International Arms Control for Military Artificial Intelligence? Three Lessons from Nuclear Weapons." *Contemporary Security Policy* 40, vol. 5 (2019): 285-311. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1576464.

> The *Contemporary Security Policy* is a peer-reviewed research journal focusing on armed violence, intervention, and conflict resolution. In the article, "How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence?" the authors draw parallels between the anticipated "arms race" for AI and the control of nuclear weapons. The article provides insights on institutional norms against proliferation, arms control, and the susceptibility of emerging weapons to human error. Understanding the lessons of recent arms races are essential to studying emerging arms technology.

Surber, Regina. "Artificial Intelligence: Autonomous Technology (AT), Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) and Peace Time Threats." *ICT4Peace Foundation*, February 21, 2018, https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2018_RSurber_AI-AT-LAWS-Peace-Time-Threats_final.pdf.

> ICT4Peace is a policy-oriented international foundation, with the purpose of promoting cybersecurity and a peaceful cyberspace through negotiations with governments, companies, and non-state actors. The report focused on information the international community about the risks of AI, particularly autonomous technology and weapons. The report suggests ways the international community can work to counter and prevent the weaponization of AI, including the risks of non-weaponized AI. The report provides a basic understanding of AI, autonomous technology, autonomous weapons, and underlying risks of applying human traits to technological devices.

Manheim, Karl, and Lyric Kaplan. "Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy." *Yale Journal of Law and Technology* 21 (2019): 106-188. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/yjolt21&i=106.

> The *Yale Journal of Law and Technology* is a law review on the intersection between the law and technological advancements. The article, "Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy," analysis the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) to manipulate democracy, decisional privacy, and information privacy. As civil participation in democratic elections decreases and influence of unaccountable institutions increases, the article places partial blame on the deployment of AI in weak regulatory environments. The article posits democratic states with weak regulatory environments suffer from unprotected privacy rights unable to keep pace with rapidly increasing AI technology. Privacy security concerns among civilians is a threat to basic principles of democratic Member States.

Sawaya, Sterling and Kenneally, Erin E. and Nelson, Demetrius and Schumacher, Garrett J. *Artificial Intelligence and the Weaponization of Genetic Data*, GeneInfoSec Inc., April 24, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3635050.

> GeneInfoSec is a genetic research corporation with the mission to protect sensitive genetic information. The report, *Artificial Intelligence and the Weaponization of Genetic Data*, studies how advancements in AI pose a threat to genetic data and how improvements in data science could lead to the weaponization of genetic data. As AI rapidly advances in medical science and clinical generic-based diagnostics, AI's inclusion in sensitive information exposes the vulnerabilities of open-source medical systems. The ability for AI to be used to steal and manipulate genetic information poses a threat to the security of Member States and their civilians.

II. Combatting the Global Illicit Arms Trade

Bergema, Reinier, Tanya Mehra, and Méryl Demuynck. "The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, September 2020. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2020/09/SALW-Synthesis-Report.pdf.

> The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism is an independent think-tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and support on counter-terrorism prevention and rule of law. The report "The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance" analyzes the link between arms trafficking and terrorist financing. The report summarizes previous reports by the Centre, breaking down arms trafficking across six regions and three indicators of trafficking. The report provides research on the source of arms for illicit trade, conditions in which illicit arms trading may be more prominent, and the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Rebensdorf, Daniel J. "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Legal and Economic Impact of International Arms Dealing." *Currents: Journal of International Economic Law* 25, no. 1 (2022): 68-91. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/curritlj25&i=70 .

> *Currents: Journal of International Economic Law* is a law journal focused on all areas of international economic law. In the article, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money," the author explores international law procedures to regulate legal arms dealings and police illegal arms trade, along with the major roll both licit and illicit arms trading plays in the global economy. The international community continues to struggle with enforcement measures on illicit global arms transportation, trying to find the balance between promoting free trade and reigning in flourishing black markets. The article looks at the economic security implications of the illicit global arms trade and how these economic considerations guide regulations on illicit arms trade enforcement measures.

Broadhurst, Roderic, Jack Foye, Chuxuan Jiang and Matthew Ball. "Illicit firearms and other weapons on darknet markets." *Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice* 622, (March 2021), https://www.aic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-03/ti622_illicit_firearms_and_other_weapons_on_darknet_markets.pdf.

> *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice* is a journal published from the Australian Institute of Criminology designed to inform policymakers, researchers, and the public current research in the field of criminology. The article "Illicit firearms and other weapons on darknet markets" analyses the rising avenue of illicit arms trade: cryptocurrency and anonymous online markets, or the darknet. Research compiled information on illicit arms trade on the Tor darknet platform, using web crawler technology to report unique listings for weapons. The study provides information on the emerging way the illicit arms trade continues to thrive and proliferation globally.

Mustapha, Mala, and Haruna Yerima. "Somalia: State Collapse and the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons." in *The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa*, 2019: 863–877. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-62183-4_41#:~:text=The%20collapse%20and%20volatility%20of,fuelling%20violence%20and%20war%20economy.

> *The Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa* is a compilation of critical analyses of theories and practices in small arms proliferation and the impact on conflict in Africa. The chapter on Somalia analyzes the links between arms proliferation and state collapse in the Member State across varying internal conflicts. Somalia's porous borders, weak governance, and unregulated national security system provide a challenge in controlling the proliferation of the illicit arms trade within the Member State. The chapter provides a case study on the effects of weak peacebuilding and disarmament on the illicit arms trade.